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ABSTRACT
Interconnected embedded devices are increasingly used in
various scenarios, including industrial control, building au-
tomation, or emergency communication. As these systems
commonly process sensitive information or perform safety
critical tasks, they become appealing targets for cyber at-
tacks. A promising technique to remotely verify the safe
and secure operation of networked embedded devices is re-
mote attestation. However, existing attestation protocols
only protect against software attacks or show very limited
scalability. In this paper, we present the first scalable attes-
tation protocol for interconnected embedded devices that is
resilient to physical attacks. Based on the assumption that
physical attacks require an adversary to capture and disable
devices for some time, our protocol identifies devices with
compromised hardware and software. Compared to existing
solutions, our protocol reduces communication complexity
and runtimes by orders of magnitude, precisely identifies
compromised devices, supports highly dynamic and parti-
tioned network topologies, and is robust against failures. We
show the security of our protocol and evaluate it in static
as well as dynamic network topologies. Our results demon-
strate that our protocol is highly efficient in well-connected
networks and robust to network disruptions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, networked embedded devices are increasingly
present in every aspect of our lives. This paradigm, often
referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT), is expected to
constantly evolve in scale and complexity, reaching 20.8 bil-
lion devices by 2020 [2]. Technologies like Bluetooth Smart,
IEEE 802.15.4, Wi-Fi Direct, ZigBee, or Z-Wave enable em-
bedded devices to form large wireless mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs). In MANETs, all devices cooperate in the distri-
bution of data in the network, thus establishing a decentral-
ized and self-organized network topology. Interconnected
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embedded devices are frequently used in industrial control,
building automation, military communication, or sensor net-
works. As such systems often process privacy-sensitive infor-
mation or perform safety-critical tasks, their malfunction or
misuse can cause serious damage. Unfortunately, software
for embedded systems is typically written in unsafe program-
ming languages and often reluctantly maintained. Addition-
ally, even though an adversary requires significant resources
to physically tamper with a device [8], (secure) hardware
on embedded systems is usually not hardened against phys-
ical tampering; thus, interconnected embedded devices are
appealing targets for cyber attacks [27, 30, 34].
To detect and mitigate such attacks, it is important to
monitor the correct operation of embedded devices and de-
tect any malfunctioning or misuse as early as possible. For
this purpose, attestation protocols have been introduced,
which allow a third party, the verifier, to check the integrity
of a remote device, the prover. Since traditional single de-
vice attestation protocols are impractical in large mesh net-
works due to their overhead of attesting each device indi-
vidually, scalable attestation protocols have recently been
proposed [5, 7]. These protocols perform an efficient at-
testation of large networks by distributing the attestation
burden across all devices in the network. All scalable attes-
tation protocols are based on the assumption that an ad-
versary can only manipulate the software of provers. Thus,
they cannot withstand an adversary who is able to perform
physical attacks and tamper with the hardware of provers.
Yet, an adversary can rather easily capture a device and
tamper with its hardware as devices forming MANETs are
often distributed over wide public areas and consist of a mul-
titude of devices. Hence, a scalable attestation protocol that
is resilient to physical attacks is much needed.
Ibrahim et al. [22] presented a first approach to solve
this problem by combining existing scalable attestation ap-
proaches [5, 7] with absent detection [14] to detect both
software and hardware attacks. The absent detection proto-
col is based on the assumption that a strong adversary, who
physically tampers with a device, must temporarily take the
device offline for a certain amount of time, e.g., to disassem-
ble the device and extract secret keys [8]. To detect offline
and thus physically compromised devices, each device peri-
odically emits a heartbeat that needs to be received, veri-
fied, and logged by every other device in the network. Al-
though a functional solution to the problem, the protocol
suffers from several shortcomings. First, the amount of ex-
changed messages per heartbeat period scales quadratically
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with the number of devices in the network. This causes scal-
ability issues in large networks with respect to network com-
munication, energy consumption, and runtime performance.
Furthermore, the protocol is very error-prone, since a sin-
gle defective transmission of a heartbeat suffices to cause
a false positive, where a healthy device is mistakenly re-
garded as compromised. Aggravating this, the protocol is
only able to attest the state of the overall network and can-
not identify particular compromised devices. Hence, a single
false positive causes the entire network to be considered as
compromised. Finally, the protocol relies on the assump-
tion that during protocol execution the network topology is
static and connected, which is a very strong limitation for
wireless mesh networks.
In this paper, we present the first scalable attestation pro-
tocol (SCAP) for interconnected embedded devices that is
resilient to physical attacks. To protect against strong ad-
versaries, we build on the established assumption that an
adversary needs to take a device offline to physically tamper
with it [8, 14, 22]. In our protocol, a single leader device
periodically emits a new heartbeat that is propagated in the
network. To obtain the newest heartbeat from a neighboring
device, a device must authenticate itself with the previous
heartbeat. Since a device that is under physical attack has to
be absent for at least one heartbeat period, it will miss this
period’s heartbeat and thus be unable to obtain any further
heartbeats. To prevent a collusion between compromised
devices, heartbeats are stored in lightweight secure hard-
ware and transmitted encrypted via secure channels. Dur-
ing the actual attestation, devices that fail to authenticate
with the newest heartbeat are regarded as physically com-
promised, whereas devices with a compromised software are
detected based on existing software attestation techniques.
In case of an outage of the leader, a new leader device is
determined through a leader election process. By optionally
storing the attestation result in each device, our protocol
is able to efficiently attest highly dynamic and partitioned
network topologies.
We show that our protocol is secure against an adversary
who compromises all but one device in the network. Finally,
we demonstrate the practicability of our protocol in static
and dynamic networks. In summary, SCAP provides the fol-
lowing improvements over existing work:
• SCAP can precisely identify devices whose hardware
and/or software is compromised, if less than half of all
devices in the network are compromised.
• SCAP is very efficient. Compared to the best previ-
ous work [22], we reduce the number of sent messages
per time period from O(n2) to O(n)1, thus, achieving
scalability to millions of devices (where n denotes the
total number of devices in the network).
• SCAP is robust against network and device failures by
(1) relying on a one-to-many delay-tolerant link in con-
trast to a many-to-many continuous link, as used in the
best previous work [22], and
(2) offering a recovery mechanism, the leader election
protocol, that minimizes the amount of false negatives.
1In fact, when detecting physically compromised devices through
their absence, O(n) transmitted messages per time period is the
best possible solution, since each device must at least send or
receive one message to show that it is present.
• SCAP provides a novel efficient aggregation scheme,
e.g., attests of 4, 000 devices fit into 1kB. This allows to
attest highly dynamic and partitioned network topolo-
gies efficiently.
• SCAP is the first scalable attestation protocol that is
evaluated in dynamic network topologies.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
§ 2 we summarize existing work. In § 3 the system model,
device requirements, and adversary model are presented. In
§ 4, we describe our novel attestation approach to detect
physically compromised devices. Then, in § 5 we extend
the attestation protocol to execute a recovery protocol on
failures, verify the software integrity of devices, and support
dynamic topologies during attestation. The performance of
SCAP is evaluated in § 6. Finally, we conclude in § 7.
2. RELATED WORK
Device Attestation. Remote attestation is a mecha-
nism that allows a third party, the verifier, to check the
integrity of a remote system, the prover. Protocols that
target the attestation of a single embedded device are ei-
ther software-based [25, 26] or hardware-based [11, 18, 28].
Software-based techniques require no secure hardware, but
rely on assumptions that have been shown to be hard to
achieve in practice [6]. Hardware-based attestation mecha-
nisms provide much stronger security guarantees by relying
on lightweight security architectures. Nevertheless, single-
device approaches are impractical in mesh networks due to
the large overhead of attesting each device individually.
Recently, protocols started to focus on an efficient attes-
tation of multiple embedded devices. Park et al. [29] pro-
posed to compare the integrity measurements of multiple
devices. Yet, their approach requires identical devices and
only enables a probabilistic attack detection rate. Asokan
et al. [7] present a highly efficient attestation scheme for
large-scale networks of embedded devices that requires only
Read-Only Memory (ROM) and a simple Memory Protec-
tion Unit (MPU). In their scheme, each device attests its
neighbors and reports the aggregated result back to its par-
ent, eventually received by the verifier. Ambrosin et al. [5]
enhance this work by introducing a novel signature scheme
that enables anyone to publicly verify the attestation result
and allows the network to contain untrustworthy aggregator
devices, such as routers or cloud severs. Yet, besides the
work by Ibrahim et. al [22], which has been discussed in § 1,
existing works consider the adversary to compromise only
the software on devices. In mesh networks, this assumption
may not hold, since an adversary can comparatively easy
capture a device and physically tamper with it.
Capture Detection. Several works have been proposed on
the detection of node capture attacks, where an adversary
physically approaches and manipulates a device. They all
build on the assumption that an adversary needs to take
a device offline, in order to tamper with it [8]. Conti et
al. suggested that a node is collaboratively flagged as cap-
tured if it fails to re-meet with any other node within a fixed
time interval [14, 15]. In the approach by Ho [20], nodes
use statistical methods to detect absent neighbor devices in
static network topologies. Recently, Agrwal et al. proposed
to deploy multiple TPM-equipped cluster heads in the net-
work, which check the integrity of the software as well as
the physical presence of all nodes in the cluster [4]. Nev-
ertheless, existing approaches are unable to detect devices
with compromised software [14, 15, 20], require the deploy-
ment of additional hardware [4], are only applicable in static
network topologies [20], or lack scalability [22].
Secure Data Aggregation. Since ad hoc networks are
often deployed to collect sensory data, many efficient and
integrity-preserving aggregation schemes for mesh networks
have been proposed. Unfortunately, these schemes rely on
very costly asymmetric cryptographic operations [13, 31], re-
quire to maintain a specific network topology during aggre-
gation [21, 31], or need multiple communication rounds [36],
which both is undesirable, as it leads to communication over-
head in dynamic network topologies. Thus, a lightweight
aggregation scheme suitable for remote attestation of em-
bedded devices that supports dynamic topologies and allows
the identification of compromised devices is missing.
3. PRELIMINARIES
System Model. In our model, we consider embedded de-
vices that can be heterogeneous in terms of hardware ca-
pabilities and software resources, e.g., devices with different
software, computational power, storage capacity, or security
functionalities. All embedded devices are connected in a
mesh network topology. This topology can be static, where
devices remain stationary and the network is connected, or
dynamic, where devices can move freely and the network can
be temporarily partitioned. However, in dynamic network
topologies, we assume that devices meet each other regu-
larly due to their mobility. Devices that are unreachable for
some time δ are regarded as compromised, since it is uncer-
tain whether they will ever contribute to the network again.
We further assume that each device Di gets initialized and
deployed by a trusted network operator O, once (§ 4.1).
After deployment, the goal of O is to ensure the correct
and safe operation of all devices D1,D2, ...,Dn in the net-
work. Therefore, O regularly verifies the integrity of all de-
vices by executing the proposed attestation protocol. The
attestation protocol determines all devices whose software is
in a trustworthy, i.e., unmanipulated and up-to-date, state
and whose hardware has not been tampered with. We refer
to these devices as healthy devices, in contrast to compro-
mised devices. Executing the protocol, O is able to learn the
precise identity of all healthy and all compromised devices.
This may serve as a first step towards physically locating
and recovering compromised devices. In order to perform
the attestation protocol, O requires a connection to at least
one device in the network.
Device Requirements. We assume that each device Di
provides the minimal hardware properties for remote attes-
tation, according to the work by Francillon et al. [19]. In
practice, these properties can be implemented with ROM
and a simple MPU. ROM stores the protocol code and
cryptographic keys, and the MPU ensures an uninterrupt-
ible execution of the protocol code and allows only pro-
tocol code to access the cryptographic keys. Recently, it
has been shown that these minimal hardware properties are
available even on many low-cost commodity embedded de-
vices [24]. Additionally, our attestation protocol relies on
authentic time measurements. In order to prevent malware
from tampering with the device clock, each device must pro-
vide a write-protected real-time clock. Protected real-time
clocks are already built-in many existing commodity embed-
ded devices [35, 37]. We henceforth refer to the execution
space, where all required hardware properties are fulfilled,
as Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
Adversary Model. In this work, we regard a powerful
adversary Adv, who is able to mount attacks on the net-
work as well as the software and hardware of devices. In
detail, Adv is granted full control over all messages in the
network (Dolev-Yao model). Thus, Adv can eavesdrop, mod-
ify, delete, or synthesize all message between any two enti-
ties.2 Moreover, Adv is allowed to compromise the software
of all devices in the network. This gives Adv full control
over the devices’ execution state and storage, yet, no ac-
cess to the protected contents inside the TEE. We further
allow Adv to capture and physically tamper with up to all
but one device in the network, when attesting the overall
network state, and up to half of all devices in the network,
when knowledge on the precise identity of compromised de-
vices is required. For the physically compromised devices,
Adv is able to access device secrets and code inside the TEE
and is allowed to manipulate the clock. We note that it is
impossible to guarantee a secure device attestation, if all de-
vices in the network have physically been compromised [22].
Finally, as in [22] we assume that mounting a physical at-
tack requires at least a time tattack, in which the device is
offline, e.g., to decapsulate the device and to launch a micro-
probing attack. Depending on the device’s level of tamper
resistance and the adversaries resources, such attacks typ-
ically require hours up to weeks in specialized laboratory
environments [33].
4. SCAP
In the following, we describe the SCAP protocol, which
identifies devices in the network have physically been tam-
pered with. Note that the detection of hybrid attacks, i.e.,
attacks that target hardware and software, is discussed in
the next section (§ 5.2). SCAP consists of three different
phases. In the initialization phase (§ 4.1), the trusted net-
work operator O initializes each device once, before the de-
ployment of the network. The heartbeat phase (§ 4.2) is pe-
riodically executed during the operation of the network. In
this phase, all physically uncompromised devices maintain
a valid state by sharing a common group key, namely the
heartbeat. We will show how the heartbeat is periodically
regenerated and propagated in the network and demonstrate
that physically compromised devices are unable to obtain
the heartbeat. Finally, in the attestation phase (§ 4.3), O
initiates an attestation of the network and obtains a report,
which exhibits all physically compromised devices.
4.1 Initialization Phase
Preliminaries. Devices can either be in a healthy or com-
promised hardware state. We discretize the time into non-
overlapping time periods t ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} of fixed length δ.
We reference the starting times of each time period with
T1, T2, T3, .... The real time Tclock can be read by any device
2We note that the model allows Denial of Service (DoS) attacks,
such as jamming or cutting wires. These attacks cannot be pre-
vented against a physically present adversary. However, DoS at-
tacks have no influence on the security of our scheme, as Adv
cannot use them to forge a healthy system state.
Sender device Di Receiver device Dj
broadcast(msgnew)
Execute in TEE:
if Checktime(t− 1) = HB:
z← ADecOrAbort(hbcur ⊕ kij ,msgreq)
if z = 0:
msghb ← AEnc(hbcur ⊕ kij , hbnext)
msgnew
msgreq
msghb
Execute in TEE:
if Checktime(t) = HB:
hbcur ← hbnext
msgreq ← AEnc(hbcur ⊕ kij , 0)
Execute in TEE:
if Checktime(t) = HB:
hbnext ← ADecOrAbort(hbcur ⊕ kij ,msghb)
t← t+ 1
Dmin ← Di
broadcast(msgnew)
Figure 1: The heartbeat transmission protocol between a sender Di and receiver Dj after secure channel establishment, i.e, both devices
share a channel key kij and know their identities.
from a reliable read only clock RROC(), which for simplic-
ity is assumed to be synchronized between all devices. Each
devices keeps track of the current time period t, running
from time Tt until Tt+1. In the remainder of this section, we
assume an implementation of a function Checktime(t) that
returns a constant HB, iff the real time is within the time
period indicated by parameter t, i.e, Tt ≤ Tclock < Tt+1 and
otherwise false.
Enrollment. In the enrollment phase, the network oper-
ator O initializes the TEE of all devices with the follow-
ing secrets. First, devices store two initial heartbeats hbcur
and hbnext, which function as a group secret between all
healthy devices. Second, each device is equipped with a
device-dependent symmetric key dki, used during attesta-
tion to generate a device unique attest, and an asymmet-
ric key pair (pki, ski), employed to establish secure channels
between devices. Finally, devices record the current time
period t, their own device identifier Di, and the identifier of
the leader device Dmin, which is the first device D1 in the
network. Table 1 provides a summary of relevant definitions.
For explanatory reasons, we assume an initial enrollment
of all devices. However, SCAP also allows devices to be en-
rolled at any point in time by issuing the current heartbeat.
Acronym Usage
δ length of heartbeat period
t current time period
Di unique device identifier
Dmin device identifier of the leader device
hbcur current valid heartbeat
hbnext heartbeat valid in next time period
pki, ski key pair for channel establishment
kij , kik, . . . channel keys with neighbors Dj ,Dk, . . .
dki device key for attestation with operator
Table 1: Overview of all secrets stored in the Di’s TEE.
4.2 Heartbeat Phase
Basic Idea. The heartbeat protocol is the core protocol
of our approach. It excludes devices from the network that
are offline for more than one time period and, hence, are
assumed to be physically tampered with. During protocol
execution, a so-called leader device emits a new secret group
key, named heartbeat, that is propagated in the network.
Obtaining this heartbeat requires a device to authenticate
with the heartbeat of the previous time period. Therefore,
devices that are offline in an arbitrary time period Ta miss
the heartbeat that is propagated in Ta and thus are un-
able to obtain a heartbeat in any subsequent time period
Ta+1, Ta+2, .... Since any communication between devices
in all protocols is secured using the newest heartbeat as a
key, physically compromised devices are unable to partici-
pate any more. In the following, we describe the heartbeat
transmission protocol, formalized in Figure 1, which is run
between two neighboring devices to transfer the heartbeat
from one device to the other.
Heartbeat Transmission Protocol. The emission of
the new heartbeat in every time period is initialized by
the leader device. As soon as the leader observes that
the real time Tclock has reached the start of a new time
period (Checktime(t) returns HB), the leader first updates
the heartbeat of the current time period hbcur to the most
recently exchanged heartbeat hbnext. We remark that heart-
beats could also be indexed by the time period in which they
are active in, e.g., hb1,hb2, hb3, . . . . However, as only two
heartbeats are relevant for any device, only these two, i.e.,
the current and next heartbeat, are stored and referenced.
After updating the current heartbeat, the leader samples a
new heartbeat hbnext for the subsequent period t + 1 and
increments its time pointer t by one. Consequently, the
time period described by the pointer is now ahead of the
real time Tt > Tclock. A time pointer ahead of the real time
indicates a device that it is in possession of a heartbeat for
the upcoming time period. The leader initialization code is
illustrated below.
Execute in TEE:
if Checktime(t) = HB:
hbcur ← hbnext
hbnext ←$ {0, 1}n
t← t+ 1
broadcast(msgnew)
Network Operator O Device Di Devices Dj ,Dk, . . .
ts← time()
msgV ← AEnc(dki, ts‖n)
msgV Execute in TEE:
ts‖n← ADecOrAbort(dki,msgV)
if isValidReq(ts) :
attest← AEnc(dki, ts)
aggi ← agg(attest, n)
msgatt ← AEnc(hbcur ⊕ kij , ts‖n)
Execute in TEE:
aggj ← ADec(hbcur ⊕ kij ,msgagg)
aggi ← merge(aggi, aggj)
msgatt
msgagg
Execute in TEE:
ts‖n← ADecOrAbort(hbcur ⊕ kij ,msgatt)
if isValidReq(ts) :
attest← AEnc(dkj , tstamp)
aggj ← agg(attest, n)
msgagg ← AEnc(hbcur ⊕ kij , ts)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . possibly more devices, e.g., Dk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
res← ADecOrAbort(dki,msgres)
return verify(ts, res)
msgres
Execute in TEE:
aggk ← ADec(hbcur ⊕ kik,msgagg)
aggi ← merge(aggi, aggk)
msgres ← AEnc(dki, aggi)
msgatt
msgagg
... same as above for Dk ...
Figure 2: The attestation protocol after secure channel establishment, i.e, all devices share a channel key k and know their identities.
Next, the leader informs its neighbors about the new heart-
beat with a message msgnew. For simplicity, we henceforth
assume that two neighboring devices have already estab-
lished a shared secret kij by performing a key exchange using
their public keys authenticated with the current heartbeat.
On receiving msgnew from any device Di, a device Dj will
enter its TEE and check whether the next time period has
been reached. If this is the case, Dj will update its current
heartbeat to the previously communicated one. Afterwards,
Dj encrypts a fixed string, e.g., ’0’, under the current heart-
beat hbcur XOR-ed with the channel key kij shared by both
devices and sends the result to Di. We refer to this XOR-ed
key, as the session key. A healthy Di can decrypt the mes-
sage by also computing the session key. A successful decryp-
tion proves that Dj is in possession of the current heartbeat
(and the channel key) and is therefore eligible for the next
heartbeat. Then, Di answers with a message msghb con-
taining the next heartbeat hbnext, also encrypted with the
session key. On successful decryption, device Dj stores the
new heartbeat as hbnext. Afterwards Dj increments its time
period pointer and then announces this new heartbeat to its
neighbors with msgnew. Figure 3a illustrates the heartbeat
transmission phase in a network with 6 healthy devices and
one adversarial device DA that was physically compromised
in time period t = 2.
We note, that the heartbeat protocol relies on the avail-
ability of the leader device, which constitutes a single point
of failure. In § 5.1 we present an extension that makes the
heartbeat protocol more robust against device outages, net-
work partitioning, or targeted denial of service attacks.
4.3 Attestation Phase
Basic idea. The attestation protocol allows the operator
O to check the state of all devices in the network. For this
purpose, O issues an attestation request that is answered
by all devices with an attestation report. Propagating the
attestation request through the network arranges a spanning
tree whose root is O. This enables an efficient transmission
and aggregation of attestation reports along the spanning
tree to O. SCAP supports two variants of attestation. The
first variant allows to attest the overall network state and
is secure against an adversary who compromises all but one
device. However, it only outputs a Boolean result, namely
whether all devices are healthy or not. The second variant
precisely identifies compromised devices by id and in this
way increases the protocol’s robustness and applicability in
practice. Yet, it requires more than half of all devices in the
network to be healthy.
Attestation protocol. The protocol is formalized in Fig-
ure 2. The operator O initially connects to a device Di in
the network and emits an attestation request. The request
contains the concatenation of a current timestamp ts and
the number of devices n in the network, encrypted under
the device’s key dki, which is only shared between Di and
O. By verifying the authenticity and timeliness of the re-
quest (isValidReq(ts)), denial of service attacks through re-
plays can be prevented. Next, the attestation request, con-
sisting of the concatenation of ts and n, is propagated by
Di to its neighboring devices. This and all following com-
munication between two devices is secured with the pair-
wise session key, i.e., the current heartbeat XOR-ed with
the channel key. Any device that receives an attestation
request first verifies the request and then also propagates
the request to its neighboring devices. These steps are re-
peated until the attestation request reaches devices, whose
neighbors already have received the request. In this way, a
spanning tree is constructed. Leaf devices that cannot prop-
agate the request any further return an attestation report to
their parent device from which they initially obtained the at-
testation request. The attestation report contains their own
attest, which consists of ts encrypted under their own de-
vice key. Every non leaf device merges its own attest (and
identifier) with all received attestation reports and propa-
gates the merged report to its parent device. Eventually,
Di merges a final report that contains all healthy devices in
req
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1
2 cur
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(b) Attestation protocol.
Figure 3: In Fig 3a the heartbeat protocol is illustrated for 7 devices in time period t = 2. All devices store the initial heartbeat hb1
that was used to secure the exchange of hb2. Subsequently, hb2 is used to exchange the next heartbeat hb3 for the upcoming time period
t = 3. Such an exchange is illustrated between D4 and D6. We observe that DA was physically compromised in time period t = 2 and
thus did not receive hb2. Hence, DA is also unable to obtain hb3 or any following heartbeat. In Fig 3b, the same network is illustrated
in time period t = 3, while answering an attestation request by O. This request was forwarded to all devices that were in possession of
the current heartbeat hb3. Consequently, DA’s attest is not included in the attestation report, as it is excluded from all communication
in the attestation protocol. Using a spanning tree topology, attestation reports are propagated back to O and aggregated in each hop.
the network. This final report is encrypted under dki and
transmitted to O, who verifies the report, as described in
the next paragraph.
We note that the attestation must be completed in time
tattack or O has to periodically check the presence of Di dur-
ing attestation. Otherwise, Adv can physically tamper with
Di to extract an aggregate and induce attests of physically
compromised devices. Figure 3b illustrates the attestation
phase in a network with 6 healthy devices and one adversary
device DA that was physically compromised.
Report Aggregation and Merging. An aggregated at-
testation report consists of two parts. The first part contains
a description of all device identifiers that are in the aggre-
gate. The second part consists of the aggregated attests. For
a small number of devices, the description is a list of device
identifiers, else it is an n-bit vector, where a one at position k
indicates that Dk is contained in the aggregate. The attests
themselves are aggregated by XOR-ing all individual attests.
Multiple attestation reports are aggregated by merging their
device descriptions and XOR-ing their aggregated attests.
When attesting the overall network state, the attestation
report consists of only the aggregate, as a device identifica-
tion is not required. This decreases the size of the report
significantly (§ 6.2). Therefore, to increase efficiency, it is
useful to run the attestation with precise device identifica-
tion only, if an attestation of the overall network state fails.
Report Verification. Given a device description, O re-
computes the attests for all devices, whose id is contained
in the description. Given no description, O recomputes the
attests for all devices. If the recomputed aggregate equals
the reported aggregate and if at least n/2 attests are in-
cluded in the report, then the report is assumed to be valid.
Only then, all attested devices are assumed to be healthy
and the verification returns a bit vector, where a zero/one
at position k indicates that Dk is compromised/healthy.
4.4 Security Analysis
Intuitively, an attestation protocol is secure, when the net-
work operator O will testify a healthy system state, if not
a single device has physically been compromised. We re-
fer to such an attestation scheme as non-informative secure.
Moreover, an informative secure attestation protocol allows
O to distinguish between healthy and compromised devices.
We follow the idea of Asokan et al. [7] and prove the security
of our protocol by an adversarial experiment SECATTn,cAdv(k).
In this experiment, the adversary Adv is given access to a
network of n initialized devices Net that execute the heart-
beat and attestation protocol. Adv can interact with all
devices according to the attacker model presented in § 3.
Moreover, we assume any adversary Adv to be computa-
tionally bound (PPT). Hence, Adv is able to interact a poly-
nomial number of times k with devices in the network (and
the authenticated encryption scheme). Furthermore, Adv is
allowed to trigger and observe attestations by O. After at
most k interactions, a final attestation is initiated by O. The
output of SECATTn,cAdv(k) is then a bit vector returned by O
after verification of the final request. A bit vector with only
zeros indicates a compromised network, whereas every bit
set to one indicates a healthy device, cf. § 4.3. We cap-
ture the intuitive idea of secure attestation in the following
definition.
Definition 1. Secure Attestation Scheme. An net-
work attestation scheme for n devices is secure if
Pr[SECATTn,cAdv(k) = 1
n] ≤ negl(k)
for any PPT Adv and 0 < c < n, where c is the number of
compromised devices. An attestation scheme is informative
and secure if
Pr[SECATTn,cAdv(k)[j] = 1] ≤ negl(k)
for any PPT Adv and every compromised device Dj, where
[j] is the j’th bit in the result vector and the total number of
compromised devices c is less than n/2.
Note that the definition of a non-informative secure attesta-
tion scheme is similar to the definition given in [7], which is
defined without device identification in mind.
Security of SCAP. The security of SCAP is summarized
in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. SCAP is an informative and secure attes-
tation protocol when the length of a heartbeat period δ is
at most tattack/2, assuming security of the PRNG and au-
thenticated encryption scheme that guarantees confidential-
ity (IND-CPA) and authenticity (INT-CTXT).
In the following paragraphs, we sketch a proof to show
that SCAP is an informative secure attestation scheme. The
sketch is split in two parts. First, we sketch a proof for
Theorem 2, which formalizes the security of the heartbeat
protocol, before arguing the security of the full protocol.
Theorem 2. Any PPT Adv is unable to gain access to
any heartbeat hbt, which is used to secure the communica-
tion in time period t, before time period t + 1, assuming
δ < tattack/2, security of the PRNG, secure channels be-
tween devices and an authenticated encryption scheme that
guarantees IND-CPA and INT-CTXT.
Intuitively, the security of the heartbeat protocol is
achieved by using an interactive protocol that requires
the receiving device to prove its knowledge about the cur-
rent heartbeat to the sending device. Only then, the next
heartbeat is exchanged. This active participation makes
it impossible for offline devices to follow the continuous
‘stream’ of heartbeats.
Proof Sketch - Heartbeat. We observe that no two
heartbeats are linked. Hence, it is impossible to derive any
hbt from hb1,hb2, . . . , hbt−1 without breaking the security of
the PRNG. Moreover, assuming synchronized clocks, every
healthy device stores at most two heartbeats in any time pe-
riod t, namely hbt−1, hbt or hbt, hbt+1. When compromising
a single device in time period t and assuming an attack time
of tattack ≥ 2 · δ, the attack will be successful not earlier
than in time period t + 2. The TEE of the compromised
device will then leak at most heartbeat hbt+1, but no later
heartbeats, as these are not present in the TEE. We observe
that with any attack time tattack < 2 · δ, Adv would be able
to compromise a device without missing a single heartbeat
period, and thus render the protocol insecure.
We show that Adv is unable to gain access to the cur-
rent heartbeat by interacting with healthy devices with-
out breaking the security of the authenticated encryption
scheme. During the heartbeat exchange, all messages sent
between two devices Di and Dj are encrypted with a ses-
sion key that is the XOR of the pairwise channel key kij
and the current heartbeat hbt at time t. Thus, the session
key is only known to Di and Dj at time t. We observe that
with access to only one (or none) of the two keys, Adv is
unable to create or to decrypt a message that is accepted by
Di or Dj without breaking the INT-CTXT and IND-CPA
security of the encryption scheme. Hence, even when com-
promising further devices and extracting (past) heartbeats,
Adv is unable to decrypt any past or future communication
between Di and Dj , as Adv is missing the pairwise channel
key kij . Similarly, after compromising a device and gaining
access to all channel keys, Adv is still missing the current
heartbeat to construct the session key, required to interact
with neighboring devices. The same arguments hold for all
messages sent between devices in the aggregation protocol,
since they are all encrypted using the pairwise session key.
Proof Sketch - Attestation. The attest of a single device
Di is the encryption of the timestamp ts, issued by O, under
Di’s device key dki. Thus, Adv is only able to forge an
attest for a healthy Di with non-negligible probability when
being able to break the IND-CPA security of the encryption
scheme. Yet, to win SECATTn,cAdv, Adv has to report at least
n/2 (informative) or n (non-informative) valid attests, while
being allowed to only compromise up to c < n/2 or c < n
devices. Consequently, since Adv is unable to forge an attest
for a healthy device with non-negligible probability, Adv has
to merge the attests of compromised devices with attests
created by healthy devices.
During the actual attestation protocol, two cases can be
distinguished. First, the device Di that O approaches for
the attestation is compromised. In this case, Adv can cre-
ate an attestation report for all compromised device. How-
ever, without access to a valid heartbeat and thus session
key, Adv can only create a valid attestation request message
msgatt with non-negligible probability, when breaking the
INT-CTXT security of the encryption scheme. Hence, no
healthy device will contribute an attest. Similar, in the sec-
ond case, where O first approaches a healthy device, Adv
is, for the same argument as described above, unable to
decipher or induce any message in the attestation proto-
col between healthy device. Furthermore, the security of a
XOR aggregation scheme, as used here, is shown in [23] and
consequently, SCAP is non-informative secure, when only
accepting a complete aggregation report that includes the
attests of all devices. Furthermore, it is informative secure,
when accepting reports with at least n/2 attests, because
attests can be attributed towards their device id. Finally,
we remark that the ‘honest majority’ assumption c < n/2
is required, as otherwise a dishonest majority could fake a
healthy systems state.
5. PROTOCOL EXTENSIONS
In the following, we present three significant extensions
to SCAP. First, we make the heartbeat transmission phase
more robust against failures (§ 5.1). Next, we extend SCAP
to verify the integrity of the software on all devices in the
network (§ 5.2). Finally, we propose an extension that al-
lows efficient attestation in highly dynamic and disruptive
network topologies (§ 5.3).
5.1 Leader Election Protocol
The leader election phase extends the heartbeat trans-
mission phase, to make it more robust against failures. In
particular, devices that fail to receive the current heartbeat
elect a new leader device that takes over the tasks of the pre-
vious leader, i.e., the periodic emission of a new heartbeat.
In this way, the heartbeat protocol is able to recover from
device outages, network partitioning, or targeted denial of
service attacks.
The leader election protocol is initiated by every device
that fails to receive the heartbeat within a time δhb that is
shorter than the heartbeat period δ (δhb < δ). Devices ex-
ecute the leader election protocol inside their TEE and use
the remaining leader election time δle = δ − δhb to deter-
mine the device with the smallest id, which then becomes
the new leader device (bully algorithm). For this purpose,
devices initially generate their own heartbeat and then an-
nounce this heartbeat together with their device id to all
neighboring devices. Devices store the smallest device id
that they received in the leader election phase, including
the corresponding heartbeat. Whenever a device updates
its smallest received id and heartbeat, it broadcasts both to
their neighboring devices. Thus, the new smallest id and
heartbeat are quickly propagated in the network. A device
recognizes itself as the new leader device, if it only receives
messages from devices with higher device ids. Note that the
original leader has the smallest id in the entire network,
hence, the protocol also tolerates a return of the original
leader. In Appendix A.1, we formalize the leader election
protocol, describe it in more detail, and demonstrate its se-
curity.
5.2 Attestation of Software Integrity
In order to attest the correct and safe operation of all de-
vices in the network, it is crucial to ensure that devices are
in a trustworthy software state, free from malicious or bro-
ken software. For this purpose, we propose that the network
operator O defines a set of trustworthy software states tss
in the attestation request, when initiating an attestation of
the network. Tss specifies all software configurations that
are permitted by O, e.g., because they represent the correct
and most recent software states. When devices perform the
attestation protocol, they invoke the execution of a software
integrity measurement function in their TEE. This function
measures the integrity of installed software and compares
these measurements to the reference values specified in tss.
In this way, each device determines whether it is in a trust-
worthy or untrustworthy software state. Devices being in an
untrustworthy software state immediately abort the attesta-
tion phase and instead execute a recovery routine that allows
the device to restore a trustworthy software state, e.g., via
secure code updates [24]. Since untrustworthy devices do
not participate in the execution of the attestation protocol,
O receives a report which exclusively contains devices that
are in a trustworthy software and uncompromised hardware
state. In Appendix A.2, we extensively explain changes that
need to be done to the enrollment phase and the attestation
protocol to enable such a hybrid attestation. Furthermore,
we discuss the security of the extension.
5.3 Attestation of Dynamic Networks
Approach. The attestation protocol in SCAP (§ 4.3) ar-
ranges a spanning tree, which allows for an efficient aggre-
gation and transmission of the attestation report to the net-
work operator O. This approach works efficiently as long as
the network topology stays static during attestation, for in-
stance, as devices in the network only move as a whole (herd
mobility) or within local limits (micro-mobility). However,
in dynamic network topologies with highly mobile devices
and frequent link disruptions, it is impractical to maintain
a spanning tree topology. In such networks, communication
with a parent device could introduce a significant delay or
become highly inefficient, as the parent device could move
away. Even worse, the parent device may be temporarily
out of range and thus be disconnected from the network.
Therefore, instead of routing the attestation along a vir-
tual topology, we propose a distributed (greedy) aggrega-
tion, where attestation reports are collected and aggregated
by all devices in the network. Thus, after O initiates the
attestation protocol, each device first generates its own at-
testation report, stores this report, and broadcasts it to all
neighboring devices. When a device receives an attestation
report, it merges this report with its stored report. On ob-
serving new attests, the device broadcasts the updated re-
port to all its neighboring devices. In this way, all devices
in the network eventually store the same attestation report
and O can obtain the attestation result from an arbitrary
device in the network.
To reduce the communication complexity, an aggregation
scheme for the above mentioned approach must allow to
merge multiple reports with intersecting attests into one.
This requirement renders the aggregation function described
in § 4.3 inapplicable, because its XOR operation risks the re-
moval of intersections of attests from the aggregate. Because
of this and following the analysis of aggregation protocols
in § 2, we present a novel aggregation scheme for dynamic
networks that is particularly tailored to the application sce-
nario.
Secure & Efficient Attestation Report Aggregation.
The here proposed scheme achieves statistical security and
is slightly less powerful than the spanning tree aggregation
scheme, as it allows an adversary to compromise at most
c < n/2 − s devices, with 2−s being the statistical security
level. In our scheme, an attestation report also consists of
two parts, namely the device description and the secure ag-
gregate itself. The device description is a n-bit vector where
a bit is set for every device included in the aggregate. The
aggregate consists of an ns = (n + s)-bit vector, where a
single bit indicates the attest of a device. A device Di that
receives an attestation request with timestamp ts, creates
its own attest using a collision resistant cryptographic hash
function H by computing a = H(dki||ts) in its TEE. Subse-
quently, Di sets a bit at position i in the device identifier as
well as a bit at offset compress(a) in the secure aggregate,
where compress is a function that reduces the hash value to
a value of length ns bits. Note that compress does not need
to be cryptographically secure, but it should achieve a close
to uniform output distribution for uniformly distributed in-
put. All other bits in both vectors are set to 0. In order to
merge multiple attestation reports, a device computes the
bit-wise OR of all attestation reports. This can be done very
efficiently and allows to aggregate reports with intersections
of devices. Both the secure aggregate and the list of device
identifier could be compressed, for instance, by using a run-
length encoding. Nevertheless, even without compression,
a very short attestation report is achieved with a length of
only 2n+ s bits, e.g., 266 bytes for 1000 devices and a secu-
rity level of s = 128 bit, which is a significant improvement
over a na¨ıve concatenation of attests that requires more than
16k bytes. Even though, Adv has a good chance to guess a
small number of attests correctly, the security of the scheme
is based on the hardness to guess (at least) s attests cor-
rectly. A detailed security analysis of this scheme is given
in Appendix A.3.
6. EVALUATION
Next, we evaluate SCAP (§ 4) and its three protocol ex-
tensions (§ 5). In § 6.1, we describe our setup, give details of
the implementation, and present our measurements. Then,
we report on our network simulation results for both static
(§ 6.2) and dynamic network topologies (§ 6.3).
6.1 Implementation & Measurements
Setup. We implemented our protocol on Stellaris EK-
LM4F120XL microcontrollers. The Stellaris is a low-cost
embedded system from Texas Instrument which features
an 80 MHz ARM Cortex-M4F microprocessor and 256 kB
of Flash memory. To enable wireless mesh connectivity
Algorithm Function Runtime
ed25519 genKey() 18 ms
keyExchange() 48 ms
AES-128-GCM encrypt(16 bytes) 0.1 ms
encrypt(1024 bytes) 1.8 ms
decrypt(16 bytes) 0.1 ms
decrypt(1024 bytes) 1.8 ms
SHA-512 hash(16 bytes) 0.4 ms
hash(1024 bytes) 3.1 ms
hash(30720 bytes) 81.9 ms
Table 2: Crypto Runtime Performance on the Stellaris.
based on the ZigBee standard, we equipped the Stellaris
microcontrollers with Anaren’s CC2530 BoosterPacks.
Cryptographic Runtime Measurements. We imple-
mented the hash function using SHA-512 and employed AES
in Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) as an authenticated
encryption scheme. For the key exchange, we used Ellip-
tic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) with Curve25519 [9]. Ta-
ble 2 shows an excerpt of our cryptographic runtime mea-
surements on the Stellaris microcontroller.
We would like to stress that our implementation is based
on platform independent and unoptimized C code.3 Assem-
bler optimized code for low-end embedded systems can im-
prove the performance of cryptographic operations by orders
of magnitudes [17, 38]. We presume that similar performance
improvements are also possible on the Stellaris.
Network Runtime Measurements. For unicast mes-
sages between two neighboring devices in the mesh network,
we measured an average throughput of 35.0 kbps on the ap-
plication layer. Although the theoretical maximum through-
put in ZigBee networks is 250 kbps, other performance eval-
uations revealed similar performance losses in reality [12].
In addition, we measured an average end-to-end delay be-
tween two neighboring devices of 13.5 ms with the smallest
message size and 18.5 ms with the biggest message size.
Memory Costs. In our implementation, devices store their
own ECDH key pair (64 bytes), the current and the next
heartbeat (each 16 bytes), the leader device id (4 bytes),
k secure channel keys and device ids (each 20 bytes), and a
timestamp (4 bytes). The number k of stored secure channel
keys can be adjusted to the particular memory requirements,
since devices can establish channel keys right away by per-
forming an ECDH key exchange with a neighboring device
(§ 4.2). Additionally, devices need to temporarily store data:
the public key of a neighboring device (32 bytes) during key
exchange, a session key (16 bytes) during heartbeat trans-
mission, and the attestation report during attestation. The
size of the attestation report is dependent on the number n of
devices and the usage of the dynamic network extension. If
it is used with a security level of 128 bit, the report amounts
to n/4 + 16 bytes, if not, to n/8 + 16 bytes. However, as
reports can be compressed using run-length encoding, their
actual size is much lower for most devices in the network. In
total, devices require 104+k ·20 bytes of permanent storage
3We used SUPERCOP’s ed25519 implementation (https://
ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html) and SharedAES-GCM (https://
github.com/mko-x/SharedAES-GCM).
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ious static topologies. The dotted line shows the runtime of the
first heartbeat with the initially needed key exchanges.
and at most n/4 + 16 bytes of temporary storage.
6.2 Simulation Results for Static Networks
Setup. We first evaluated our protocol in static network
topologies, where all devices are connected and stationary.
Thus, there are no link breaks or abrupt delays in the net-
work communication. We used ns 3.25 [1] to simulate a
homogeneous network with ten to multiple million Stellaris
devices. Following the typical evaluation methodology in
scalable attestation protocols [5, 7, 22], we implemented our
protocol on the application layer and used computational
and network delays based on our measurements (see § 6.1).
Heartbeat Protocol Runtime. We simulated the run-
time of the heartbeat protocol in various topologies. Fig-
ure 4 shows the runtime for a binary, 4-ary, and 8-ary tree
topology with up to 550.000 devices, where the heartbeat
leader device is located at the root of the tree. The figure
demonstrates that in tree network topologies, protocol run-
time increases logarithmically with the number of devices in
the network. Under these conditions, the heartbeat proto-
col achieves an outstanding performance, requiring less than
2.3 seconds to reach 500.000 devices in an 8-ary-tree and less
than 1.7 seconds in a binary tree topology. Even with mul-
tiple million devices, runtime remains below 2 seconds in a
binary-ary tree topology. Only the first run of the heart-
beat protocol in the network requires little more time, since
neighboring devices initially need to exchange public keys
and perform key exchanges to establish shared secrets. Yet,
even with the additional key exchanges runtime remains be-
low 5.1 seconds for more than 500.000 devices.
Attestation Protocol Runtime. We configured the at-
testation protocol to use the software attestation extension
(§ 5.2) and thus to attest the hardware and software state
of all devices in the network. To verify the integrity of in-
stalled software, devices compute a SHA512 digest over a 30
kB software and compare the digest to an expected value
that is specified in the attestation request. For attestation
we used the spanning tree attestation approach (§ 4.3).
Figure 5 shows the runtime for a binary and 8-ary tree
topology with up to 550.000 devices, where the network op-
erator is located at the root of the tree. Additionally, we
varied the type of the attestation report, containing either
the precise ids of healthy devices (solid lines) or the state of
the overall network (dashed lines). The figure demonstrates
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Figure 5: Attestation protocol runtimes in two static topologies
with and without sending device identifiers in the aggregate.
that reporting precise device identifier introduces a notable
overhead. When reporting the overall network state, attes-
tation runtime increases barely with the number of devices in
the network, remaining below 2 seconds even for networks
with multiple million devices in almost any tree topology.
Yet, when reporting precise device ids, runtime increases to
more than 152 seconds for 500.000 devices due to the large
size of the attestation report, which increases proportion-
ally with the network size. Nevertheless, we consider that
2.5 minutes is an acceptable timeframe to obtain a report
that precisely lists which devices are in a compromised state.
Communication Costs. During heartbeat transmission,
all devices, except for the leader device, receive msgnew
(1 byte), send msgreq (17 bytes), and receive msghb (17
bytes) to obtain the newest heartbeat, using a one byte
message identifier. If devices need to (re-)establish a secure
channel key, they need to mutually exchange their public
keys, which causes an additional message overhead of 32
bytes. For instance, in a binary tree topology, devices trans-
mit in total 104 bytes, or 296 bytes with the initial key
exchange, in each heartbeat transmission period.
During the execution of the attestation protocol, all de-
vices receive onemsgV (17 bytes) ormsgatt (17 bytes). Also,
devices send a msgatt to all neighbor devices that have not
yet received msgatt and afterwards receive a msgagg from
them (≤ n/8 + 16 bytes). If the device’s software integrity
is attested (§ 5.2), msgV and msgatt contain the set of trust-
worthy software states tss, in our evaluation a 64 bytes
hash digest. In short, assuming a binary tree topology and
n = 1000 devices, during a run of the attestation protocol,
each non-leaf device transmits at most 666 bytes and each
leaf device 222 bytes.
Summary. We demonstrated that our protocol is highly
efficient in static network topologies. In comparison to the
previously best attestation protocol that is secure against
physical attacks [22], we reduce the number of transmitted
messages per time period from O(n2) to O(n). To illus-
trate this advantage, in binary-tree topologies our approach
is 27 times faster with 2000 devices and 3800 times faster
with 500, 000 devices when interpolating their results. The
comparison already considers the fastest variant presented
in [22], which requires each device to store and manage n
symmetric keys. In our protocol, devices must only store the
keys of neighboring devices, e.g., 3 in a binary tree topology.
When attesting the state of the entire network, both pro-
tocols ([22] and SCAP) show a runtime that scales logarith-
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Figure 6: Heartbeat protocol average runtime in a dynamic topol-
ogy until false positives occur. The boxplot shows the distribution
of simulation results for the single false positive case.
mically with n. Nevertheless, in contrast to [22], SCAP also
allows to determine the ids of compromised devices with low
overhead even in larger networks.
6.3 Simulation Results for Dynamic Networks
Setup. We further evaluated our protocol in highly dy-
namic and disruptive networks to investigate its robustness
in complex scenarios. To model device mobility, we ran-
domly deployed devices in a 1000m x 1000m square area and
applied a random waypoint mobility model, which is com-
monly used in literature on absence detection [14, 16]. Con-
sequently, each device repeatedly selects a random speed as
well as a random destination within the area and then moves
towards the destination at the selected speed. The random
device movement causes the network to be constantly parti-
tioned, especially for sparse networks. In order to investigate
effects like link disruptions, varying network delays, and sig-
nal interference that emerge due to the movement of devices,
we modeled an 802.15.4 physical and medium access control
layer using the ns-3.25 lr-wpan module. Modeling both
layers as well as device mobility requires a lot of computa-
tional power. This is a known issue in MANET simulations,
which leads to huge simulation runtimes [10]. For these rea-
sons, we were only able to run simulations with a few hun-
dred devices. Nevertheless, as we will show in this section,
the main hurdle of our protocol is to perform well in sparse
networks. Scalability of our approach in dense networks,
where all devices are permanently interconnected, is shown
in the previous section. In addition to the above mentioned
simulation parameters, we set the wireless communication
range to 50m (50% of the distance specified in the ZigBee
standard), the device speed to a random value between 5
and 15 m/s, and the heartbeat as well as the leader elec-
tion period to 2.5 minutes (detecting physical attacks that
require more than 10 minutes).
Heartbeat Protocol Robustness. We investigated the
robustness of the heartbeat protocol in worst cases, which
are highly dynamic and disruptive network topologies. In
particular, we examined the time until the protocol pro-
duces false positives, i.e., healthy devices that are regarded
as physically compromised, because they did not receive the
heartbeat on time. Figure 6 illustrates the average runtime
of the heartbeat protocol until a certain amount of false pos-
itives occur. The figure shows that the number of devices
in the network has a vital influence on the robustness of the
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Figure 7: Efficiency of leader election in heartbeat protocol.
heartbeat protocol. Since devices move completely at ran-
dom, the network must be sufficiently dense so that devices
meet each other frequently enough to exchange the newest
heartbeat on time. In fact, there is an exponential corre-
lation between robustness and device density, which causes
the average error-free heartbeat runtime to quickly increase
from 2.4 days for 60 devices to weeks with more than 90 de-
vices. To illustrate the sparseness in this scenario, 60 stati-
cally connected devices could cover at the maximum 29% of
the area and 90 devices 43.4%. Nevertheless, as shown by
the boxplot, the runtime between multiple simulation results
differ widely. This makes it hard to guarantee robustness for
sparse network scenarios. Investigating the false negatives,
we identified the main cause in the random movement of de-
vices. Commonly, a single device hides away, i.e., does not
encounter other devices, and thus has no chance to receive
the newest heartbeat on time. This cannot be prevented by
faster computations or smaller communication delays in our
protocol, but only be increasing the duration of the heart-
beat phase. We also observed that this hiding of a single de-
vice has barely any cascading effect on other devices. Hence,
as shown in Figure 6, if tolerating a minimal amount of false
positives, significant longer protocol runtimes are possible.
Next, we analyzed the effectiveness of the leader election
extension by simulating an outage of the heartbeat leader
device. Figure 7 shows the largest fraction of devices that
agreed on a common new leader with an increasing time
interval for the leader election phase. It again illustrates
the importance of the network density. In dense networks,
leader election information can spread faster and thus reach
more devices in shorter time. Nevertheless, even in relatively
sparse networks with 60 devices, a time interval of 150 sec-
onds is on average sufficient to let all functioning devices
agree upon a new common leader. This also highlights our
robustness against targeted DoS attacks, where an adver-
sary attempts to disrupt the heartbeat protocol by breaking
the heartbeat leader device.
Attestation Protocol Runtime. For the evaluation of
the attestation protocol in dynamic networks, we used our
dynamic attestation extension (§ 5.3) with a statistical se-
curity level s of 128 bits. Figure 8 shows a boxplot of the
elapsed time between the emission of the attestation request
and the moment when all devices in the network store the fi-
nal attestation result, i.e., a report that contains all devices,
for an increasing number of devices in the network. With an
increasing network density, attestation reports spread faster
and the overall attestation protocol runtime decreases. How-
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with an increasing number of devices.
ever, this effect is not as distinct as with the heartbeat pro-
tocol, where we observed an exponential correlation between
protocol performance and network density. This is because,
in contrast to the heartbeat protocol, where a single message
is flooded in the network, each device must contribute with
a message, i.e., its individual attestation report, to a global
attestation aggregate. Furthermore, the size of the attes-
tation report increases proportional with the network size,
though, being reasonably small for common network sizes
(e.g., 2.5kB for 10, 000 devices). Figure 8 also shows that the
runtime of the attestation protocol varies little. This guar-
antees that the final result is with high probability reached
within a certain time frame, e.g., 5 minutes for 100 devices.
Communication Costs. Message costs in dynamic net-
work topologies are, except for the attestation report, the
same as in static network topologies (§ 6.2). However, due
to link failures, some messages are transmitted more often
in dynamic topologies. In our simulations, we varied the
network size between 40 and 100 devices and let devices ac-
tively poll their neighbors for the newest heartbeat after 10
seconds. Our results revealed that, depending on the net-
work size, each device sends on average 19.4 to 21.0 msgnew
(poll heartbeat) and 1.04 to 1.12 msgreq as well as msghb
messages. Hence, in total, devices transmit on average 114
bytes in each heartbeat transmission phase. Compared to
static network topologies (§ 6.2), this is less than 10% com-
munication cost overhead.
Nevertheless, because the attestation result is distributed
to all devices, the actual attestation consumes considerably
more communication in disruptive networks. Conducting
the same simulations as described above, we observed that
each device exchanges on average 12.4 attestation reports in
networks with 40 devices, 16.0 with 60 devices, 18.9 with 80
devices, and 21.5 with 100 devices. Each exchange requires
a device to send one msgatt and receive one msgagg. Note
that the dynamic attestation report in msgagg has a size of
at most n/4 + 16 bytes. Thus, in total, devices transmit on
average 1375 bytes in networks with 100 devices, which is
4.2 times more than in static network topologies.
Summary. We showed that our heartbeat and attestation
protocols are robust and efficient, even in highly partitioned
and unpredictably changing network topologies. In fact in
an exemplary low connectivity scenario, with a maximum
possible area coverage of 43% for randomly moving devices,
the heartbeat protocol still runs on average 65 days with-
out producing a single false positive with tattack = 10 min-
utes. We further illustrated the effectiveness of the leader
election protocol, by completely recovering networks from
device outages in less than 130 seconds in the same setting.
Finally, we demonstrated the robustness of our attestation
protocol in dynamic networks and showed that its perfor-
mance is dominated by network connectivity as opposed to
the protocol’s communication complexity.
7. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
We presented the first scalable attestation protocol SCAP
for mesh networked embedded devices that is resilient to
physical attacks. Compared to existing solutions, our pro-
tocol reduces the number of transmitted messages per time
period from O(n2) to O(n), thus scaling to millions of de-
vices and outperforming existing solutions by orders of mag-
nitude. In addition to attesting the overall state of the net-
work, SCAP is able to precisely identify devices that run
compromised software or have been physically manipulated.
We demonstrated that our protocol is robust and efficient,
even in very dynamic topologies, as it can perform an attes-
tation or recover from device outages within minutes.
In future work we plan to investigate our protocol in spe-
cific network application scenarios, such as drone-based de-
livery systems or wireless sensor networks. Moreover, we
want to make use of MANET simulators that are optimized
for scalability and/or parallelism, in order to be able to sim-
ulate thousands of moving devices.
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APPENDIX
A. PROTOCOL EXTENSIONS
A.1 Leader Election Protocol
Heartbeat Transmission Extension. The leader elec-
tion protocol is shown in Figure 9 and extends the heartbeat
transmission phase described in § 4.2. We henceforth divide
each time period T1, T2, T3, ... of length δ in two phases: the
heartbeat phase, whose length is δhb (formerly δ), and the
leader election phase, whose length is δle = δ − δhb. Fur-
thermore, we assume that the function Checktime(t) returns
the constant HB if Tt ≤ Tclock < Tt + δhb, the constant LE
if Tt + δhb ≤ Tclock < Tt+1, and false otherwise.
Every device Di that did not receive a heartbeat within
δhb, indicated by Checktime(t) = LE, will generate its own
heartbeat hbinext, set the current leader device id to its own
id (Dimin ← Di), and update its time pointer by one. In a
next step Di informs its neighbors about the new heartbeat
with a message msgle.
Two devices that already initialized the leader election
phase negotiate the heartbeat as follows. First, a leader
election request message msgle req is generated by Dj that
contains a session key to secure the remaining communica-
tion. Then, Di sends the smallest received device id Dimin
and the corresponding heartbeat to Dj . Initially these are
Di’s own id and generated heartbeat. Device Dj will then
compare its previous smallest id Djmin with the just received
id. If Dimin < Djmin, Dj will update Djmin to Dimin and set
hbjnext to hb
i
next. Finally, Dj will inform Di of the result of
the comparison, which is also stored by Di. Both devices
will then continue to further broadcast the new heartbeat.
The protocol terminates implicitly, once the smallest device
id has been identified. We note that a leader, who is absent
during the heartbeat phase, can rejoin by participating in
the leader election phase. In § 6.3, we analyze the effective-
ness of the leader election protocol.
Security. The leader election protocol uses the same two-
key mechanism, i.e., the session key constructed by heart-
beat and channel key, as the original heartbeat protocol to
secure all messages. This makes it impossible for an ad-
versary Adv to synthesize or to decrypt a message that is
accepted or sent by healthy devices. Otherwise, Adv could
break the IND-CTXT or IND-CPA security of the encryp-
tion scheme. Hence, the actual leader election process can
only be hindered, yet not controlled by Adv.
A.2 Attestation of Software Integrity
To achieve a secure attestation of hardware and software
the following extensions to SCAP are required:
Enrollment Phase Extension. In the enrollment phase,
the network operator selects an arbitrary software integrity
measurement function Measure() and stores its implementa-
tion in the TEE of each device D1, ...,Dn in the network.
Traditionally, these mechanisms measure the integrity of a
software by computing a hash value over its binary code [32],
though recent approaches are also able to measure the run-
time behavior of a software, for the purpose of detecting
sophisticated code-reuse attacks [3]. In the following, we
abstract from these implementation details and use Mea-
sure() as a black box that takes an input i, e.g., a descrip-
tion of what to measure, and generates a measurement m,
which represents the current software state of a device (Di:
Measure(i) → m).
Attestation Protocol Extension. Before invoking the at-
testation protocol, O specifies a set of trustworthy software
states tss. Tss consists of multiple (input, measurement)-
pairs (tss = {(i1,m1), (i2,m2), ..., (ix,mx)}) and a descrip-
tion which network device should use which input (e.g., de-
vices from type 1 should use i1, etc.). A pair (ik,mk) in
tss indicates that the expected measurement for the input
ik is mk (Measure(ik) = mk). In this way, tss specifies all
measurements that are permitted by O, e.g., because they
represent the correct and most recent software states.
During the execution of the attestation protocol, tss is
distributed to all devices in the network. For this pur-
pose, O initially incorporates tss into msgV (msgV ←
AEnc(dki, ts‖n‖tss)). In a similar way, by incorporating
tss into msgatt (msgatt ← AEnc(kcur, ts‖tss)), devices for-
ward tss to neighboring devices. Afterwards, each device
Di measures its local software configuration by extracting
its appropriate (ik,mk) pair and executing the measure-
ment function Measure() with the input ik in its TEE.
Subsequently, Di checks whether the output generated by
Measure() matches mk and if this is the case continues with
the execution of the attestation protocol, as explained in
Section 4.3. If both values do not match, Di invokes a
recovery routine, which allows the device to restore to a
trustworthy state by performing a secure code update pro-
tocol with O. Executing this extended attestation protocol,
O receives a msgres that only contains ids of devices that
are in a trustworthy software and uncompromised hard-
ware state. Note that the protocol could easily be further
extended to precisely report devices which are in an untrust-
worthy software but uncompromised hardware state, e.g.,
by introducing an additional msgagg s and msgres s that
is specifically generated and aggregated by untrustworthy
devices and transmitted to O.
Security. The security of the protocol extension results
from the security of the main protocol (§ 4.4), the secure
hardware properties (§ 3), and the adversary model (§ 3).
Since the protocol extension is executed in the TEE of de-
vices, malware is unable to tamper with the protocol code,
execution, or any stored protocol data (e.g., secret keys).
Thus, an adversary, who compromises the software of a de-
vice, is only able to prevent protocol execution or manipulate
the input/output to/from the protocol. However, prevent-
ing protocol execution has no influence, since untrustwor-
thy devices stop executing the attestation protocol, anyway.
Manipulating the input or output to or from the protocol
has no affect, as all inputs and outputs are secured using
authenticated encryption with secrets that are only acces-
sible within the TEE. Additionally, all inputs and outputs
are dependent on a session-specific timestamp ts issued by
O. Therefore, replay attacks are likewise worthless. These
measures also prevent Dolev-Yao network adversaries from
compromising security. By contrast, a physical attacker is
able to tamper with the protocol code, data, or execution.
However, as explained in the security analysis of the main
protocol (§ 4.4), a physical attacker is unable to obtain the
current heartbeat hbcur, which is required to participate in
the attestation protocol or heartbeat protocol.
A.3 Efficient Attestation Report Aggregation
Security. As already shown in the security analysis of the
aggregation protocol (§ 4.4), Adv is unable to exchange any
message with healthy devices during attestation. This ar-
gument also holds for the efficient aggregation scheme, as
only the aggregation inside the TEE is modified and not the
protocol itself. Consequently, the security of the efficient
aggregation scheme, depends on the hardness of attestation
report itself. An attestation report is accepted if at least n/2
valid attests are contained in the report. By assumption Adv
is only allowed to compromise up to c < n/2−s devices and
thus, can only compute up to c valid attests. The remaining
n/2 − c attests have to be guessed by Adv. The security of
our aggregation scheme is formalized in Theorem A.3.
Theorem 3. Assuming collision resistance of the hash
function, any PPT Adv, compromising up to c < n/2− s
devices can successfully forge an efficient attestation report
that is accepted by O with probability of at most 2−s for any
n > 2 · s.
Proof Sketch. The attestation report consists of two bit
vectors, the first vector annotates the devices included in
the network and the second vector annotates the actual at-
tests (each attest is a single bit in the attest vector). To
successfully include one additional attest into the report,
Adv has to set an additional bits in the device vector and to
guess the correct bit in the attest vector. A single mismatch
between the aggregate computed by O and the reported ag-
gregate results in a reject of the attestation report. As the
position of an attest bit for a single device is computed by
compress(H(dki‖ts)), we observe that Adv could break the
collision resistance of the hash function, if Adv would achieve
non-negligible advantage in guessing an attest bit correctly
without access to the device key. Assuming a uniform dis-
tribution of the attestation bit, Adv will guess its position
correctly with probability 1
ns
. However, Adv can follow a
better strategy than randomly guessing all positions of the
n/2− c bits that are required for a valid attestation report.
We note that due to the relatively small set of bit positions,
collisions between multiple devices are likely. The best strat-
egy the Adv can follow is thus, to guess collisions with the
c bits that Adv can set correctly in the attest vector. A col-
lision with any of the attest bits occurs with probability of
at most c
ns
(collisions within the attests of compromised de-
vices are also possible). With this strategy, Adv can achieve
a winning probability of at most ( c
ns
)n/2−c. We observe that
c
ns
= n/2−s
n+s
≤ 1
2
and by assumption n/2 − c ≥ s and thus,
Adv wins the game with probability of less than 2−s.
We remark that for the sake of technical simplicity of the
proof, the attestation vector is set to a fixed length ns =
n + s. This is required to make it a hard task for Adv to
guess the zero bits in the attest vector for smaller n, when
setting all bits in the device vector. For lager n, ns could be
chosen smaller than n+ s.
Heartbeat Leader Election Protocol (after secure channel establishment)
Sender device Di Receiver device Dj
Secrets in TEE: t, hbcur, hbnext, kij , Dmin Secrets in TEE: t, hbcur, hbnext, kij , Dmin
Execute in TEE:
if Checktime(t) = LE:
hbcur ← hbnext
hbnext ←$ {0, 1}n
t← t+ 1
Dmin ← Di
broadcast(msgnew)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Leader election exchange start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Execute in TEE:
if Checktime(t) = LE:
hbcur ← hbnext
hbnext ←$ {0, 1}n
t← t+ 1
Dmin ← Di
if Checktime(t-1) = LE:
msgle req ← AEnc(hbcur ⊕ kij , 0)
msgle req
Execute in TEE:
if Checktime(t-1) = LE:
z ← ADecOrAbort(hbcur ⊕ kij ,msgle req)
if z = 0:
msgle hb ← AEnc(hbcur ⊕ kij , hbnext‖Dmin)
msgle hb
Execute in TEE:
if Checktime(t-1) = LE:
hbi‖Di ← ADecOrAbort(hbcur ⊕ kij ,msgle hb)
if Di < Dmin:
hbnext ← hbi
Dmin ← Di
msgleader ← AEnc(hbcur ⊕ kij , hbnext‖Dmin)
msgleader
Execute in TEE:
if Checktime(t-1) = LE:
hbnext‖Dmin ← ADecOrAbort(hbcur ⊕ kij ,msgleader)
Figure 9: Leader election protocol.
